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THROUGH THE LOOKING HOLE OF THE
MULTI-SENSORY TRADEMARK RAINBOW:
TRADEMARK PROTECTION OF COLOR PER SE
ACROSS JURISDICTIONS: THE UNITED STATES,
SPAIN AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
Glenda Labadie-Jackson1
"There is nothing in the intellect that was not first in the senses."2
An oft-asserted prediction states that only trademarks that
stimulate all five senses with the objective of attracting the consumer's
attention will acquire a firm and durable presence in today's complex
marketplaces.3 This, in turn, has provoked the broadening of the rep-
ertoire of signs and symbols potentially eligible to serve as trademarks
for products or services. Vivid examples of these are the sounds,
scents, flavors, colors and three-dimensional forms, which collectively,
are grouped under the generic category of "non-traditional
trademarks."4
A recent debate within the field of intellectual property law
hinges on whether a color's inherent qualities prevent it from serving
as a trademark. The extent and dimension of the controversy are de-
termined, to a certain degree, by the definition of "color." One defini-
tion of color is, a visual perception phenomenon produced by luminous
rays that enables one to differentiate objects even though the objects
may appear otherwise identical.5
Interpreted in a vacuum, that definition may influence the way
in which the inquiry at hand is approached, tempting one to conclude
that those who request the trademark registration of one color, to use
1 Associate Professor of Law, University of Puerto Rico. Visiting Scholar, Harvard
Law School, 2007-2008.
2 ARISTOTLE, ON THE SOUL.
3 MARTIN LINDSTROM, BRAND SENSE: BUILD POWERFUL BRANDs THROUGH TOUCH,
TASTE, SMELL, SIGHT, AND SOUND 3 (2005).
4 See THOMAS P. ARDEN, PROTECTION OF NONTRADITIONAL MARKS: TRADEMARK
RIGHTS IN SOUNDS, SCENTS, COLORS, MOTIONS AND PRODUCT DESIGNS IN THE U.S.
(2000); Jerome Gilson & Anne Gilson LaLonde, Cinnamon Buns, Marching Ducks
and Cherry-Scented Racecar Exhaust: Protecting Nontraditional Trademarks, 95
TRADEMARK REP. 773, 773 (2005).
5 See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 447 (2002).
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it in relation to products or services want to reserve for themselves a
characteristic of the objects which is attributable to the solar rays.6
The controversy surrounding granting trademark protection to
colors is complicated. The purpose of this article is to serve as a useful
platform for the further elaboration, discussion, and assessment of the
arguments wielded in the course of the debate over unique color trade-
mark registration.7 Additionally, this article traces the legislative and
jurisprudential development of the rules pertaining to this topic as it
has evolved in the United States, Spain, and the European Union.
I. THE PROTECTION OF COLOR TRADEMARKS IN THE
UNITED STATES: LEGISLATION AND CASE LAW
1. Legislation
The protection that the United States legal system confers to
trademarks arises primarily out of the Law of Trademarks of 1946,
commonly known as the Lanham Act.' The statute does not mention
the registration of a single color, nor does it explicitly contemplate the
protection of other non-traditional signs or symbols.
The legislative history of the Lanham Act, the principles that
informed the enactment of the statute and the overall tenor of its
amendments suggest that the Act intended to offer trademark protec-
tion to new modes of trade signs.9
The Lanham Act adopts an ample and inclusive definition of
trademark.' ° The Act defines a trademark as, "a word, symbol, name
or a combination of these" that distinguishes a product or a service and
identifies its source." Moreover, the Act establishes that the nature of
the trademark will not constitute a ground for registration refusal, un-
less the law expressly states the contrary.'
2
The above arguments support the claim that non-traditional
signs such as sounds, scent, and three-dimensional forms should have
access to the register of the Office of Patents and Trademarks of the
6 See Paul Blondeel, About Color Marks, THIRD EuROPEAN JUDGES'SYMPOSIUM, OF-
FICE FOR HARMONIZATION IN THE INTERNAL MARKET (OHIM) (2003), available at
http://oami.europa.eu/en/office/ejs/prog2003.htm.
7 The phrases "sole color, "color per se" and "unique color" are used to designate
the case in which a trademark consists of one color. Therefore, the trademarks
consisting of combinations of colors are excluded from the discussion.
8 Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (2006).
9 See Juanita J. Webber, The Green-Eyed Monster Sore or Can Color Really Be
Trademarked Under The Lanham Act? Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc.,
21 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 425, 428-432 (1996).
10 Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
11 Id.
12 Id.
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Unites States (hereinafter "PTO") and receive federal trademark pro-
tection.1 3 Additionally, these arguments are crucial to the issue of the
registration of color per se.
14
2. Case Law
a) Traditional Rule
Although the issue of trademark protection of a single color, or
color per se, was not before the Supreme Court in Leschen & Sons Rope
Co. v Broderick & Bacom Rope Co., 5 the opinion stated in dictam:
"[y]ou may register a mark, which is otherwise distinctive, in color,
and that gives you the right to use it in any color you like; but you can
not register a mark of which the only distinction is the use of a
color. .16
It was not until 1985 that a federal court, in the notorious case
of In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., diverged from Leschen be-
cause the court did not find any compelling reasons that would pre-
clude the registration and protection of a trademark consisting of a
color alone. 17
b) Owens-Corning
In Owens-Corning, the federal circuit court analyzed the his-
tory of the judicial protection of color per se in the United States, and
declared that it was inappropriate for the courts to continue to apply
judicial precedents decided before the enactment of the Lanham Act, to
the extent that they were inconsistent with the principles and objec-
tives espoused in said law.
18
After examining the broad definition of trademark contem-
plated by the Lanham Act and analyzing various court decisions in
which protection was proffered to non-traditional signs, the court con-
cluded that the color of a product could serve as a trademark, so long
as it satisfies the applicable statutory requirements. 19
Owens-Corning did not end the divergence of opinions concern-
ing trademark protection color; in fact, division in federal circuits has
13 See generally Gilson & LaLonde, supra note 4.
14 See generally Lawrence B. Ebert, Trademark Protection in Color: Do It by the
Numbers!, 84 TRADEMARK REP. 379 (1994).
15 A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., 201 U.S. 166
(1906).
16 Id. at 172.
17 In re Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
18 Id. at 1119.
'9 Id. at 1122.
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intensified.2 ° In light of the divergence of opinions, the United States
Supreme Court heard the paradigmatic case of Qualitex Co. v. Jacob-
sen Products Co., and issued a unanimous opinion declaring that,
under the Lanham Act, a sole color could serve as a trademark for a
product or service. 2 '
c) Qualitex v. Jacobsen
i. Facts
In the 1950s, Qualitex began to manufacture and sell a green-
gold color pad used on dry cleaning presses.2 2 Several decades later,
Jacobsen started to sell a very similar product.2 3 As a result, Qualitex
registered the green-gold color in the PTO and filed a lawsuit against
Jacobsen for trademark infringement.2 4
ii. Federal District Court Decision
The federal district court held that trademark registration of
the green-gold color was valid.25 The court reasoned that the color
green-gold had acquired a secondary meaning because the consumers
associated it with the product manufactured by Qualitex. 26 Further-
more, the court found that the fact that Jacobsen copied the color and
the general appearance of the product would pose a risk of confusion
among consumers." Thus, the court prevented Jacobsen from using
the green-gold color on its product.2"
iii. Ninth Circuit Decision
The federal court for the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court
and ordered the cancellation of the trademark. 29 It concluded that, al-
though the Lanham Act did not expressly prohibit the registration of a
unique color, it was appropriate to preserve the traditional rule. In
support of its rationale, the court invoked the theories of "color deple-
tion" and "shade confusion."3 °
20 See generally Master Distributors, Inc. v. Pako Corp., 986 F.2d 219 (8th Cir.
1993); NutraSweet Co. v. Stadt Corp., 917 F.2d 1024 (7th Cir. 1990).
21 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prod. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 166 (1995).
22 Id. at 160.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Prod. Co., 21 U.S.P.Q2d 1457, 1458 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
26 Id.
27 Id. at 1459.
28 Id. at 1462.
29 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prod. Co., 13 F.3d 1297, 1305 (9th Cir. 1994).
30 Id. at 1302.
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iv. United States Supreme Court Decision
To clarify definitively the controversy of whether a trademark
could consist of a sole color and dissipate the difference of criterion
prevailing among the various United States Circuit Courts, the Su-
preme Court of the United States granted certiorari.3 1 Justice Breyer,
in a unanimous opinion, reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.3 2
The Court held that there was no legal principle that prohibited ex-
tending trademark protection to a sole color; hence, the district court's
decision prevailed.3 3 In support of its decision recognizing Qualitex's
sole-color trademark, the Supreme Court set forth the arguments dis-
cussed below.
1) The Legislative History of the Lanham Act
The Supreme Court emphasized that both the language and
the spirit of the Lanham Act permit the inclusion of colors in the wide
spectrum of signs that could constitute trademarks. Justice Breyer ob-
served that the law defines the concept of a trademark as "any word,
name, symbol, or any combination of these," implying that the key ele-
ment is the capacity of the sign to distinguish the origin of the product,
and not its physical state.34 He underscored the fact that the Lanham
Act clearly establishes that the nature of the trademark cannot not be
a ground for registration refusal, unless expressly forbidden by the
Act.35
The Court added that an examination of the legislative history
of the Lanham Act and the Congressional purpose behind it, led to the
conclusion that color per se should be included as a sign that may con-
stitute a trademark. The Court recognized that just a few years prior,
the Act was amended; however, this did not modify the relevant dispo-
sition.36 In light of the following factors, (i) the federal circuit's Owens-
Corning decision; (2) the PTO's delineation of a clear policy allowing
registration of this type of trademark and, (3) a legislative commission
report recommending that the definition of trademark not be re-
stricted,3" the Court concluded that the fact that Congress did not pro-
hibit the registration of color per se suggested a tacit legislative
ratification of the rule adopted in Owens-Corning.3' The Court also
referred to a United States Senate report expressly indicating that the
31 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prod., 514 U.S. 159 (1995).
32 Id. at 160.
33 Id. at 174.
34 Id. at 162.
35 Id. at 171.
36 Id. at 172.
37 Id.
38 id.
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definition of trademark within the existing legal framework did not
impede the registration of colors, forms, or sounds.3 9
2) Principles that Inspired the Adoption of the Lanham Act
The Court also relied upon the fundamental principles that in-
form trademark law to support its decision in Qualitex.4 ° The Court
declared that since a color per se could serve the fundamental objec-
tives of United States Trademark Law - serve as a means to identify
products, facilitate consumers' purchase decisions and function as a
financial reward for quality-products manufacturers - it should be
admitted into the plethora of signs that are eligible for trademark
protection. 4 '
3) Previous Case Law
The Court refused to apply previous judicial decisions holding
that a sole color could not constitute a trademark. 42 The Court pointed
out that the precedents were no longer persuasive because they inter-
preted the applicable law before the adoption of the Lanham Act and
were therefore contrary to the language and legislative history of the
Act. 43
4) Distinctiveness
The court stated in dicta that in, order for a color to become
eligible for trademark protection, it was necessary to demonstrate that
the color had acquired secondary meaning.44 This rationale is the ba-
sis on which various federal courts have held that color alone will
never be inherently distinctive.
4 5
Attempts to place boundaries on the implications arising from
the Supreme Court's opinion suggested that this was an unresolved
matter that would persist until the Court made further clarifica-
tions.4 6 After five years of persistent debate about Qualitex, the Court
clarified the state of affairs relating to trademark protection for unique
39 Id. at 173.
40 Id. at 163.
41 Id. at 166.
42 Id. at 171-172.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 163-164.
45 See Forschener Group Inc. v. Arroz Trading Co., 124 F.3d 402, 408 (2d Cir.
1997); Fabrication Enters v. Hygenic Corp., 64 F.3d. 53, 58 n.3 (2d Cir. 1995).
46 See Kevin Jordan & Lynn Jordan, Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., The
Unanswered Question: Can Color Ever Be Inherently Distinctive?, 85 TRADEMARK
REP. 371, 397 (1995); Jonathan Hudis, Removing the Boundaries of Color, 86
TRADEMARK REP. 1, 10 (1996).
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colors in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros.4" In Wal-Mart the
Court held that color per se could never be inherently distinctive; thus,
eligibility for trademark protection hinges on whether the color has
acquired secondary meaning.4 s
5) Rejection of "The Color Depletion" Theory
The Supreme Court in Qualitex grappled with the theory of
"color depletion," as it had been the basis for sustaining the traditional
rule holding that color per se could not constitute a trademark.4 9 Those
who favor the depletion theory argue that the impossibility of register-
ing a trademark consisting exclusively of a unique color is supported
by the view that there is a relative dearth of colors.50 Therefore, if a
seller could appropriate a color, he would gain an immeasurable com-
petitive advantage and restrict competitor's access to the market.5 '
In Qualitex, the Court rejected the depletion theory as a basis
for the adoption of a categorical rule prohibiting the registration of col-
ors. 2 The Court indicated that, in the majority of cases, sellers would
have alternate colors available to identify their products. 53
The Court added that in those cases in which a problem of color
depletion exists, the functionality doctrine could prevail over a color
trademark claim.5 4 Furthermore, the Court's holding underscored that
it is possible to avoid the exclusive appropriation of a color when con-
fronted with any of the following scenarios: (i) the color serves a func-
tional purpose or, (ii) the color is essential in order to inform certain
characteristics of the product, such as purpose, cost or quality.55
6) Rejection of the "Shade Confusion" Theory
The theory of "shade confusion" establishes that extending
trademark protection to a color could cause uncertainty with respect to
what constitutes a concrete protected trademark. It may be unclear
what subtle tones and shadings of color can be validly used by competi-
tors. Additionally, application of the classic criteria of probability of
47 Walmart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 212 (2000).
48 Id. at 216.
49 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Prod., 514 U.S. 159, 167-170 (1995).
50 Id. at 168.
51 See Rudolph Callman, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MO-
NOPOLIES § 18.13 (1983).
52 Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 164-169.
53 Id. at 169.
54 Id.
55 Id.
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confusion is difficult if the appearance of color depends on various con-
tingent or subjective factors such as illumination.5 6
The Supreme Court rejected the theory of shade confusion indi-
cating that the courts are routinely called to consider the difficult
question of whether two words are similar enough as to cause confu-
sion in the public and thus, color should be treated no differently in
that respect.5 7 The Court added that judges should be capable of ap-
plying the same standards when comparing tones or shades of colors,
and, if necessary, they can replicate the illumination under which the
product is normally sold.5"
II. THE POST-QUALITEX STATE OF AFFAIRS
Various commentators predicted that the Qualitex decision
would lead to a stampede of color trademark applications.5 9 Not with-
standing, although official statistics do not offer a clear picture of what
has occurred, the available evidence suggests that Qualitex did not re-
sult in a significant increase of filings corresponding to this type of
application.60
An informal study carried out in 2004 revealed that in the nine
years following Qualitex, the number of registration of color trade-
marks (around thirty) was similar to the amount of registries ac-
counted for during the ten years which elapsed between Owens-
Corning and Qualitex.6 1
Application of the rule announced in the case is limited, and
requires that the applicants take significant steps prior to obtaining
the inscription of its trademark in the PTO.62 Furthermore, Qualitex
merely validated the practice of the PTO, harking back to the time of
Owens-Corning, in which the registration of trademarks consisting of
only one color was allowed. Consequently, the case did not involve a
transcendental shift regarding how the PTO evaluated and considered
this type of application.6 3
The study also revealed that two-thirds of applicants who filed
this type of application had used the color in connection with their
products for a minimum period of ten years.6 4 Likewise, it is more
56 Id. at 167.
57 Id. at 167-168.
58 Id.
59 See Christopher C. Larkin, Qualitex Revisited, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 1015, 1017
(2004).
60 Id. at 1015.
61 Id. at 1025.
62 Id. at 1026.
6 See Larkin, supra note 59, at 1026.
64 id.
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probable that the application to register the color trademark will be
considered favorably when the use of the color concerning the product
is unusual, unexpected, or unnecessary.6 5
III. COLOR TRADEMARKS REGISTRATION IN THE PTO
The PTO requires that the inscription of a trademark be ac-
companied by a depiction "substantially similar" to the one which ap-
pears on the actual product.6 6 In addition, it requires that the
application for the trademark describe the trademark with "ordinary
language," even if the applicant also describes the color based on a
code of a color system such as PANTONE.6 7
The PTO considers the following factors to determine if a color
has acquired site secondary meaning: (i) whether the use of the color is
common in the relevant segment of the market in question; (ii) the
product's sale volume; (iii) whether publicity directly captures the cus-
tomer's attention with respect to the color of the product; (iv) whether
the color is also used in promotional articles; (v) whether consumers
associate the color with the nature of the product; and (vi) whether the
color serves some utilitarian purpose.6"
IV. COLOR TRADEMARKS IN SPAIN
1. The Law of Industrial Property of May 16, 1902
Spain's Law of Industrial Property of May 16, 1902 defined the
concept of trademark as any sign or material medium, whatever its
class or form, which serves to identify the products of an industry.6 9
65 See Forschner Group, Inc. v. Arrow Trading Co., 124 F.3d 402, 408 (2d. Cir.
1997); Mana Products, Inc. v. Columbia Cosmetics Mf., Inc., 65 F.3d 1063, 1071
(2d Cir. 1995); Regal Jewelry Co. v. Kingsbridge International Inc., 999 F. Supp.
477, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); In re Denticator Int'l., Inc., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d 1218 (T.T.A.B.
1995); In Re Hudson News Co., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1915 (T.T.A.B. 1996); In re Orange
Communications, Inc., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1036 (T.T.A.B. 1996).
66 See U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING
PROCEDURE § 1202.05 (d) (2007).
67 See U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING
PROCEDURE § 1202.05 (e) (2007). PANTONE is a color matching system. See
www.pantone.com (follow "about us" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 9, 2007).
68 Midge M. Hyman & Hannah Y. Cheng, REGISTRABILITY AND ENFORCEABILITY OF
NON-TRADITIONAL TRADEMARKS IN THE UNITED STATES, PRACTICING LAW INSTI-
TUTE, PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HAND-
BOOK SERIES 6-9 (2005).
69 Law of Industrial Property (May 16, 1902), tit. 2, art. 21 (Sp.), as reprinted in
GACETA DE MADRID, May 18, 1902, at 782-783.
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The language of the Act was broad enough to infer the protec-
tion of color trademarks.70 The Regulation of Trademarks of June 12,
1903, however, established that colors could not constitute
trademarks. 7 '
2. Statute of Industrial Property of 1929
The Statute on Industrial Property of 1929, enacted by Law of
16 September 1931, defined trademark as any sign or material me-
dium, whatever its class and form, that serves to signal and distin-
guish similar products.7 2
The Act directly addressed the registration of a sole color. Spe-
cifically, article 126 stated that a trademark could not consist of colors
per se.73 The prohibition extended to trademarks that were exclusively
constituted by a fundamental 74 or a pure75 color.
Additionally, the Spanish doctrine posed the question of
whether the prohibition also encompassed shades or tones of a funda-
mental color. Some commentators argued that the shades of a color
were unlimited; therefore, if one were to protect one of them, there
would always be other available shades of the same fundamental
color.76 However, most Spanish legal commentators rejected this argu-
ment and pointed out that in many occasions, it was extremely diffi-
cult to discern between shades of the same color. Therefore, awarding
protection to one color shade would cause untenable confusion.7 7
3. Law 32/1988 of November 10, 1988
Spain's Law 32/1988 of November 10, 198878 reiterated the ba-
sic principle that article 126 of the Statute of Industrial Property ini-
70 Jaume Pellis6 Capell & Maria Teresa Solanelles Battle, Hacia la Protecci6n del
Color Cnico, REVISTA DE DERECHO MERCANTIL 1563, 1565 (1998).
71 id.
72 Royal Order of April 30, 1930, published in the Gaceta de Madrid on May 21,
1930, no. 127.
73 See Carlos FernAndez-Novoa, El Color y las Formas Tridimensionales en la
Nueva Ley Espafiola de Marcas, ACTAS DE DERECHO INDUSTRIAL Y DERECHO DE
AUTOR 41 (1989-1990).
74 The seven colors of the rainbow are considered "fundamental colors." See Capell
& Solallanes, supra note 70, at 1568.
75 "Pure colors" are those that are easily identifiable such as black and white. See
Capell & Solallanes, supra note 70, at 1568; see also Fernindez-Novoa, supra note
73, at 48.
76 See Capell & Solanelles, supra note 70, at 1569.
77 Id.
78 Ley 32/1988 [Trademark Law] (Nov. 10, 1988) (Sp.), BOLETIN OFICIAL DEL Es-
TADO, Dec. 11, 1988, at 32238, available at httpJ/www.wipo.int/clea/docs-new/pdf/
en/es/es010en.pdf.
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tially introduced. It defined a trademark as any sign or medium that
served to distinguish identical or similar products or services. 79 Just
like its predecessors, the Law of 1988 configured a trademark defini-
tion sufficiently broad as to allow trademarks constituted of only one
color;8 0 however, it expressly prohibited trademark protection of a sin-
gle color.8" Article 11.1 (g) of the Law of 1988 established the general
rule that a single color could not be registered as a trademark. 2
The Law of 1988 excluded the possibility of obtaining protec-
tion of color per se, even in the event that the color had acquired a
secondary meaning." The law was interpreted as creating a presump-
tion that color per se lacked distinctiveness. Furthermore, the law did
not recognize a color per se as a means of resolving the tension between
protecting commercial identity in the market vis-i-vis sustaining free
market competition. 4
4. Law 17/2001 of December 7
Title II, article 4 of Spain's Law 17/2001 of December 7 defines
trademark as any sign susceptible to graphic representation that
serves to distinguish products and services.8 5 In addition, it recog-
nizes a numerus apertus catalogue of signs that could constitute trade-
marks such as words, figures, three-dimensional forms, sounds,
symbols, drawings, letters, and numbers.8 6 It is important to stress
that the list includes three-dimensional forms and sounds, two typical
examples of non-traditional signs.8 7 Nevertheless, any reference to col-
ors as a trademark was excluded.8 8
The language and the principles that informed the enactment
of the Law of 2001 justify the conclusion that, in light of the open-
ended character of the list of signs that constitute trademark, denial of
registration of non-traditional signs or symbols, is near impossible.
Thus, the list of signs afforded trademark protection is not exclusive
and signs not listed may be entitled to trademark protection.8 9 This
79 Id. at tit. 1, art. 1.
80 See Capell & Solanelles, supra note 70, at 1572.
81 Id. at 1573-1574.
82 Id. at 1576-1578. See also Manuel Martinez Miguez, La Protecci6n del Color
(Jnico como Marca en el Derecho Espaiol, ACTAS DE DERECHO INDUSTRIAL Y DER-
ECHO DE AUTOR 117 (1982).
83 See Capell & Solanelles, supra note 70, at 1578-1579.
84 Id. at 1579.
85 Law 17/2001 [Trademark Act], Dec. 7, 2001, art. 4 (Sp.), available at http:ll
www.wipo.int/clea/docsnew/pdf/en/es/es08Oen.pdf.
86Id.
87 Id.
88id.
89 See SALVADOR FERRANDIS GONZALEZ, COMENTARIOS A LEY DE MARCAS 46 (2002).
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argument is strengthened by the fact that the express prohibition
stated in article 126 of the Statute of Industrial Property of 1929, as
well as in article 11.1 (g) of the Law 32 of November 10, 1988, does not
appear in the Law of 2001.
Another argument supporting the assertion that the Spanish
legal system now admits the trademark registration of a unique color
is that this constitutes a prescription of European Union Trademark
Law, to which Spain's legislative branch should adapt. In fact, the Dec-
laration of Purposes of the Law of 2001 establishes that one of its
objectives is to incorporate international and European Union legal
norms.
90
In sum, there are strong arguments supporting the conclusion
that the Spanish legal system admits the registry of a trademark con-
sisting in unique color.9 1 Nevertheless, some commentators state that
registration of a single color is still not possible, since it contravenes
the general principle that a sign that lacks distinctiveness cannot con-
stitute a trademark.
92
V. THE PROTECTION OF COLOR TRADEMARKS IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION
1. Comparative Law Assessment: National Legal Regimes of
European Union Member States
The majority of the member states of the European Union al-
low the registration of color trademarks.9 3 Most countries require that
the applicant shows that the color has acquired secondary meaning,
that is, that the public harbors the expectation that the goods sold
with this certain color are those of a specific seller.9 4
With respect to the registration procedure, the majority of the
national trademark offices have established a requirement that the
color be adequately identified, by way of a sample or by reference to an
internationally-recognized color-code, such as PANTONE. 95 In some
countries, a narrative description of the color is also required as part of
the application process.96
90 Trademark Act, Explanatory Memorandum § 4.
91 See Europe Legislation Analysis Subcomm., Int'l Trademark Ass'n, Non-Tradi-
tional Marks in Europe: Shape and Colour Trademarks, Common Issues with Ob-
taining, Exploiting and Enforcing (2005), available at https://www.inta.org/
downloads/tapnontradEU.pdf.
92 Id.
93 See id.
94 Id.
95 id.
96 See id. See generally Pantone Home Page, http: / /www.pantone.com /pages/
pantone /index.aspx.
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2. Directive and Regulation Regarding the Community Trademark
The adoption, interpretation, and application of the national
laws of the member states of the European Union should be in accor-
dance with the principles of the European Union Law.9"
With regard to European Community Law, the regulation of
trademarks is principally governed by "First Directive 89/104/EEC of
the Council, to Approximate the Laws of the Member States Relating
to Trade Marks"9 8 and "Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 on the
Community Trademark."9 9 Both are fundamental sources of law that
apply to European Union trademarks. Additionally, national trade-
marks are regulated primarily by these supranational rulings and sec-
ondarily by national legislation.' 0 0
Article 2 of the Directive defines trademark as those signs that
can be an object of a graphic representation, such as words, phrases,
drawings, letters, or numbers, as long as such signs meet the condition
that they distinguish the product or services of a seller from those of
other sellers.101 Article 4 of the Council Regulation contains a similar
provision. 102
The definition of trademark provided in the Directive and in
the Council Regulation is substantially broad.10 3 It merely offers an
open-ended list of signs that serve as examples of what may be con-
strued as a trademark. This leaves the door open to non-traditional
signs, as long as they fulfill the function of identifying and distinguish-
ing products or services. Therefore, as a general rule, as is the case
with other signs, a single color can constitute a European Union trade-
mark, so long as it is distinctive and meets other pertinent require-
ments and criteria. 10 4
3. European Court of Justice (ECJ)
The controversy regarding the protection of color per se has
been the subject of intense debates in the European Court of Justice.
In the renowned case of Libertex Group vs. Benelux Merkenbureau of
97 Jaume Pellisd Capell & Maria Teresa Solanelles Battle, La Protecci6n del Color
(nico como Marca en el Derecho Comunitario, REVISTA DE DERECHO MERCANTIL
1101,1123-1124 (1998).
98 See Council Directive 89/104, 1989 O.J. (L 40) (EC), available at http:l/
oami.europa.eu/ES/mark/aspects/direc/direc.htm
99 See Council Regulation (EC) No. 40/94 of 20 December 1993, The Community
Trade Mark (2003).
'0o See Capell & Solanelles, supra note 97, at 1104.
101 See Council Directive, supra note 98.
102 See Council Regulation, supra note 99.
103 See Capell & Solanelles, supra note 97, at 1109.
104 Id.
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2003, the European Court of Justice declared the applicable standard
in these cases.
0 5
The Court reasoned that colors do not have the inherent capac-
ity to communicate specific information, such as the origin or the
source of the product or service. 10 6 Nevertheless, it found that color per
se could constitute a trademark if the applicant demonstrates that the
mark acquired a secondary meaning. 107 The Court established that, in
determining if a color is distinctive, it is necessary to take into account
all the intervening circumstances, including the time during which the
company has made use of the color, and the public's perception with
regard to the link between the unique color and the corresponding
product or service. 108
The Court invoked the "Council Regulation (EC) No. 40/94 on
the Community Trademark" 0 9 to support the decision, which, as men-
tioned previously, defines trademark in broad terms." 0
4. Reports of the World Intellectual Property Organization
The World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") has
declared that a single color can constitute a trademark. The following
are some of the arguments outlined in its most recent reports."'
In one report, WIPO recognized that sellers make deliberate
and systematic use of unique colors and combinations of colors in their
105 Case C-104101, Libertel Groep BV v. Benelux - Merkenbureau 2003 ECJ (May
6, 2003), available at http://www.copat.de/markenformen/c-104Olen.pdf.
106 Id.
107 id.
108 Id.
109 See Council Regulation, supra note 99.
110 Id.
I" See Non-Traditional Marks Non-Traditional Marks - Key Learnings- Key
Learnings, STANDING COMMITTEE ON THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS, INDUSTRIAL DE-
SIGNS AND GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS (Nov. 12-16, 2007, available at http://www.
wipo.intledocs/mdocs/sct/en/sct18/sct_18_2.pdf; see also New Types of Trade-
marks, STANDING COMMITTEE ON THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS, INDUSTRIAL DESIGNS
AND GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS (Nov. 13-17, 2006), available at http://www.wipo
.int/edocs/mdocs/sct/en/sct_16/sct_162.pdf. See World Intellectual Property Org.
[WIPO], Standing Comm. on the Law of Trademarks, Industrial Designs and Geo-
graphical Indications, Non-Traditional Marks- Key Learnings (Nov. 12-16, 2007)
(prepared by the Secretariat), available at httpJ/www.wipo.intedocs/mdocssctlen/
sct_18/sctilS_2.pdf; World Intellectual Property Org. [WIPO], Standing Commit-
tee on the Law of Trademarks, Industrial Designs and Geographical Indications,
New Types of Trademarks (Nov. 13-17, 2006) (prepared by the Secretariat), availa-
ble at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/sct/en/sct_16/sct_16_2.pdf.
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products, in their promotional memorabilia, and in their points of sale,
as an important instrument of commercial identification.
112
The reports states that, of the seventy-five offices of registry of
trademarks questioned on the topic, (i) seventy-one permit the regis-
tration of combinations of colors and, (ii) seventy-two accepted the reg-
istry of individual/unique colors or combinations of colors associated
with other signs." 3
WIPO requires that the color trademark application include a
description of the colors in words." 4 The graphical representation of
the trademarks of color can be effectuated by means of a pictorial rep-
resentation of the goods that possess the color claimed.' 5 WIPO may
also require that the applicant present a chromatogram or refer to a
code of an internationally recognized color system, such as Focoltone,
PANTONE, RAL or RGB." 6
On the other hand, it is a necessary condition that the unique
color must have acquired distinctiveness as a condition for registry eli-
gibility. The color will not be susceptible to protection if it constitutes
a functional element of the product. It is understood that a color trade-
mark is functional if it accomplishes a utilitarian objective, if it is used
to obtain a determined technical result in relation to the product, is
fundamental to the use or end to which the product is destined, or af-
fects its cost or quality." 7 However, said reports affirm that it may be
convenient to deny registration of some colors based on criteria that go
beyond those outlined above, such as when the conferral of trademark
registration would contravene principles of public policy or provide an
unfair competitive advantage." 8
5. Madrid Protocol
The Rules of Practice for Trademark-Related Filings under the
Madrid Protocol Implementation Act, which entered into force on April
1, 2007, also contemplate the registry of a unique color. 1 9 As per the
European Union's adhesion to the Madrid Protocol, upon October 1,
2004, trademark title-holders may file an international application as
a member state of the European Union.' 2 °
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 id.
119 See http://www.wipo.int/madrid/es/legal-texts/pdf/common_regulations.pdf.
120 Id.
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VI. SOME OBJECTIONS TO THE PROTECTION OF COLOR
PER SE
Although the rule established by the United States Supreme
Court and ECJ's cases of Qualitex and Libertex -respectively- to
confer protection to color trademarks invested with secondary mean-
ing, has been adopted by many other jurisdictions, it has not been ex-
empt from critics. It is worth underscoring that some of the principal
arguments that have been wielded against the rule adopted in both
cases are precisely those that various jurisdictions have invoked to
deny trademark-registry protection to color per se.
1. Theory of Color's Inherent Inability to Operate as Trademark
The first obstacle with which the admission of unique-color
trademark has to deal with is the generalized idea that a color per se is
not, on its own, an adequate vehicle to distinguish the products or ser-
vices of a seller from others that operate in similar circumstances.
That line of thought argues that the public tends to see a color as a
mere accessory or ornamentation of the product as opposed to an inte-
gral-identifying characteristic.
12 1
Nevertheless, "the experience of countries whose legal system
offers a trademark definition outlined in broad terms and eschews an
outright prohibition of [per se] color registry, has demonstrated that
color can acquire distinctive force with use, and that, on occasion, it
may even become the only medium with which a producer may identify
and distinguish his products in the market. "122
2. Theory of "Shade Confusion"
Both Qualitex and Libertex ruled out adopting the "shade con-
fusion" theory. Some interpreted that as an attempt to avoid the par-
ticular-idiosyncratic controversies that stem from the different ways
color may be perceived. As such, the absence of an overarching crite-
rion that may guide the courts while considering these types of contro-
versies remains problematic.
123
The perception of colors depends on a multiplicity of factors
that are often intrinsically variable and exert reciprocal influence as
they interact. Among the examples of these variable factors are sur-
face of the product, illumination, as well as questions hinging on
121 See Callmann, supra note 51, at 137.
122 See Capell & Solanelles, supra note 70, at 1584.
123 See Jean Hayes Kearns, Comment, Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co.: Or-
ange You Sorry the Supreme Court Protected Color?, 70 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 337
(1996).
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Whether the color is juxtaposed with another of various other colors. 124
Nevertheless, among the many important shifting-contingent variables
that one must grapple with, the most important is the perception and
assimilation of color as essentially a subjective, hinging on the mind of
the observer, which in itself is subject to shifts or accommodations,
according to the age and memory of the observer in question.
125
Even if a seller achieves trademark inscription of a color, the
nature of this type of sign creates obstacles that impede or curtail the
enforcement of the resulting rights that stem from Trademark Law.
The problems stemming from the particular variables affecting the
perception of color create considerable difficulties when attempting to
apply the "probability of confusion" test. It may also be extremely com-
plicated to determine what is the threshold that validates that a com-
petitor used a color substantially similar to the protected
trademark.
126
On the other hand, the problem of the perception of shades of
color can also signify a competitive disadvantage for the competitors,
who may feel compelled not to use any similar shades of a protected
color in order to prevent a possible claim regarding a violation of pro-
tected trademark. 127
In Qualitex, the Supreme Court of the United States rejected
this line of argument and stated that the courts are routinely obliged
to make comparatively complicated assessments on which their deci-
sions will hinge. As such, the Court held that other controversies faced
by the courts are not essentially different from cases in which it is al-
leged that two competitors use similar colors to identify their products.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court conveniently glossed over two funda-
mental problems which lower courts would eventually have to deal
with.
First, the environment under which the colors are to be com-
pared as shades of colors can substantially differ with respect to the
various circumstances in which the consumer observes the color asso-
ciated with the product. 128 Consumers are not necessarily in the habit
of undergoing an exhaustive analysis of the appearance of the product
to determine its source, origin, or the brand with which it is associ-
ated. In fact, the modern-day proliferation of trademarks has created
an atmosphere in which many consumers accustom themselves to a
124 See George A. Agoston, COLOR THEORY AND ITS APPLICATION IN ART AND DE-
SIGN 7 (1979); Anni Berger-Schunn, PRACTICAL COLOR MEASUREMENT 1-2 (1994).
125 See RALPH M. EvANs, AN INTRODUCTION TO COLOR 223 (1948).
126 See Gilson & LaLonde, supra note 4.
127 See G.D. Searle & Co. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 265 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1959).
128 See Kearns, supra note 123.
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rapid, often nonchalant, identification of the origin associated with the
product or advertisement under observation.
129
Second, the rejection of the "shade confusion" theory raises a
significant problem. Regardless of the supposed human capacity to dis-
tinguish millions of colors, the intuitive reality is that common experi-
ence may lead people to conclude that the subtle differences in shades
of a color can be practically imperceptible and impossible to
determine.
130
3. "Color Depletion Theory"
In Qualitex, the court discarded the notion that a relative
dearth of perceptible colors could justify a prohibition to the registra-
tion of a single color. It indicated that hundreds of shades of colors are
manufactured and that thousands of additional colors can be obtained
by mixing existing colors.'
3
'
The experts deem that, under an optimal visual environment, a
normal eye can distinguish and discern about ten million different col-
ors. Nevertheless, this analysis is not helpful in the context of trade-
marks given that ordinarily the consumer does not have the
opportunity to compare the shades of two similar products. 132
Moreover, consumers often depend on their memories to buy
products. Thus, they will often be compelled to reach decisions under
less than optimal circumstances regarding the scope of available refer-
ence points. In fact, albeit in theory, hundreds of names for colors ex-
ist, the majority of the people use as little as twelve.' 33
In order to avoid consumer confusion - or to prevent the viola-
tion of a protected trademark - competitors may eliminate from their
catalogue of options a relatively wide segment of the alternative broad
bands of available colors. That, in turn, depletes the offer of available
colors for commercial use and therefore, makes it difficult for the com-
petitors to choose an appropriate identifiable color, which also tends to
prevent them from competing effectively.'
34
An additional problem that stems from the rejection of the
"color depletion" doctrine is that it is often the case that there are a
limited number of desirable colors within any given industry. If all at-
tractive colors for a specific category of products are not available be-
cause they are protected, a new competitor will be at a disadvantage
129 Id.
130 See Stephen J. Newman, Kill The 'Mere Color' Rule: Equal Protection for Color
Under the Lanham Act, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1595 (1994).
131 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prod., 514 U.S. 159, 166.
132 EVANS, supra note 125, at 230.
133 Id.
134 See Kearns, supra note 123.
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because probably it will be obliged to use a less attractive color that is
not yet protected. 135
VII. CONCLUSION
The world markets are currently experiencing an ever-increas-
ing proliferation of multi-sensory stimulants - including those cata-
logued as "nontraditional"- used with the objective of capturing the
attention of potential consumers and to serve the basic goal of identify-
ing products or services.
Undoubtedly, one of the challenges that the field of trademark
law will inevitably face and grapple with during the course of the im-
pending decades is the adoption of principles that apply to the peculiar
problems posed by the grant of exclusive property rights over trade-
marks consisting of non-traditional signs, such as scents, sounds,
flavors, and colors.
135 Id.
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